2021 Decisions

Opinions of the United
States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

3-5-2021

Thomas Ahearn v. East Stroudsburg Area School D

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2021

Recommended Citation
"Thomas Ahearn v. East Stroudsburg Area School D" (2021). 2021 Decisions. 227.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2021/227

This March is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in 2021 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law
Digital Repository.

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
______________
No. 20-1577
______________
THOMAS AHEARN,
as parents and natural guardians of
Louis Ahearn, EILEEN AHEARN,
as parents and natural guardians of Louis Ahearn,
Appellants
v.
EAST STROUDSBURG AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT;
COLONIAL INTERMEDIATE UNIT 20
______________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 3-19-cv-00868)
Honorable Malachy E. Mannion, United States District Judge
______________
Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
February 9, 2021
BEFORE: CHAGARES, SCIRICA, and COWEN, Circuit Judges
(Filed: March 5, 2021)

______________
OPINION


This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7
does not constitute binding precedent.

______________
COWEN, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiffs Thomas Ahearn and Eileen Ahearn, as parents and guardians of their
adult son Louis Ahearn, appeal from the order of the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania granting the motion to dismiss filed by Defendants East
Stroudsburg School District and Colonial Intermediate Unit 20. We will affirm.
I.
During the 2013-2014 school year, Louis attended East Stroudsburg High School
North and was educated in an autistic support class conducted by Colonial Intermediate
Unit 20. Louis “has been identified as an individual with an intellectual disability,
autism, and speech and language impairment.” (A34; see also A35 (alleging that
Defendants were aware that Louis had several specified skills limitations).) “To allow
for the attendance of [Louis] at the East Stroudsburg Area School District, the Defendants
developed a staff action for emergency plan ‘SAFE PLAN’ in order to redirect him and
keep him on task during the school day.” (A35.) However, Defendants allegedly failed
to follow the plan. Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged that, on one occasion, their son was
restrained and placed in handcuffs by a school resource officer at the request of the
Defendants’ representatives. On another occasion, he was allegedly locked in a school
bathroom (where he caused harm both to himself as well as items in the room). “At no
time prior to treating Louis in this way did the Defendants call the Plaintiffs and/or 911 as
indicated in Louis’ ‘SAFE PLAN.’” (A36.) According to Plaintiffs, Defendants’ actions
caused Louis to develop fear, become afraid of strangers, and have an aversion to using
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restrooms and bathrooms. Because they were concerned that Defendants could not
educate Louis and follow the SAFE PLAN, Plaintiffs enrolled him in a different school in
November 2015. Plaintiffs also alleged that Louis would require additional educational
support beyond the time frame mandated by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
Plaintiffs filed a state court action against Defendants, alleging, inter alia,
violations of the Fourteenth Amendment and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29
U.S.C. § 504. After Defendants had removed the case to the District Court and moved to
dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. In their
amended complaint, they advanced a Fourteenth Amendment claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and a disability discrimination claim under Section 504. Defendants again moved
to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The District Court granted the
motion “[because] both of plaintiffs’ federal claims against defendants fall under the
IDEA and [because] plaintiffs have not exhausted the IDEA administrative remedy
process.” Ahearn v. E. Stroudsburg Sch. Dist., CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:19-0868, 2020
WL 754337, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 13, 2020).
II.
“The IDEA requires participating states to provide disabled children with a FAPE
[free and appropriate public education], 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A), and sets forth an
administrative mechanism for resolving disputes concerning whether a school has
complied, id. § 1415.” Wellman v. Butler Area Sch. Dist., 877 F.3d 125, 131 (3d Cir.
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2017). The statute requires exhaustion of other federal claims “seeking relief that is also
available” under the IDEA:
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to restrict or limit the rights,
procedures, and remedies available under the Constitution, the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990, title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, or
other Federal laws protecting the rights of children with disabilities, except
that before the filing of a civil action under such laws seeking relief that is
also available under this subchapter, the procedures under subsections (f)
and (g) shall be exhausted to the same extent as would be required had the
action been brought under this subchapter.
20 U.S.C. § 1415(l). Accordingly, “exhaustion of the IDEA’s administrative process is
also required in non-IDEA actions where the Plaintiff seeks relief that can be obtained
under the IDEA.” Batchelor v. Rose Tree Media Sch. Dist., 759 F.3d 266, 272 (3d Cir.
2014). Under the Fry test, “we consider the ‘crux’—the ‘gravamen’—of the complaint to
determine whether a plaintiff seeks relief for ‘denial of the IDEA’s core guarantee [of] . .
. a free and appropriate education.’” Wellman, 877 F.3d at 127 (quoting Fry v. Napoleon
Cmty. Schools, 137 S. Ct. 743, 748 (2017)).1
It is undisputed that Plaintiffs did not exhaust administrative remedies under the
IDEA. Plaintiffs, however, argue that the IDEA’s exhaustion mandate did not apply to
his claims because: (1) the rights recently afforded by the Supreme Court in Knick v.
Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019), to property owners to a federal forum for
claims of unconstitutional treatment at the hands of state officials should be extended to
students and families who claim the deprivation of constitutional rights in a school

The District Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule 12(b)(1). See, e.g., Batchelor, 759 F.3d at 271-72.
We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
1
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setting; and (2) the District Court erred in its application of the Fry test. We, however,
conclude that the District Court appropriately applied the statutory exhaustion
requirement.
Knick did not involve the application of a federal statutory provision mandating
the exhaustion of administrative remedies. Instead, the Supreme Court overruled prior
precedent holding that a property owner whose property has been taken by a local
government has not suffered a violation of his Fifth Amendment rights and cannot bring a
federal takings claim in federal court until a state court has denied his claim for just
compensation under state law. See, e.g., id. at 2167-68. The Supreme Court recognized
that exhaustion of state remedies is not a prerequisite to an action under § 1983. See,
e.g., id. at 2167. However, the IDEA does set forth its own exhaustion requirement
applicable to constitutional claims under § 1983 where the plaintiff seeks “relief that is
also available” under the special education statute. See, e.g., Ahearn, 2020 WL 754337,
at *7 (“The Court in Knick did not overturn Fry and did not address exhaustion under the
IDEA.”).
Plaintiffs further argue that exhaustion was not required under Fry because neither
of the alleged incidents “had anything to do with [Louis’s] educational program.”
(Appellants’ Brief at 8.) According to Plaintiffs, they sought redress for unconstitutional
conduct and discrimination in violation of the Rehabilitation Act. They also contend that,
“[h]ad Louis been handcuffed or locked in a bathroom at a public facility other than the
school, he could have raised the same claims against a separate entity” and that any
“adult individual who had been handcuffed without justification and/or locked in a
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bathroom would have a right to bring a claim for mistreatment” (id. at 8-9). See, e.g.,
Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 756 (“First, could the plaintiff have brought essentially the same claim
if the alleged conduct had occurred at a public facility that was not a school—say, a
public theater or library? And second, could an adult at the school—say, an employee or
visitor—have pressed essentially the same grievance? When the answer to those
questions is yes, a complaint that does not expressly allege the denial of a FAPE is also
unlikely to be truly about that subject; after all, in those other situations there is no FAPE
obligation and yet the same basic suit could go forward.”). Furthermore, Plaintiffs
contend that exhaustion should be excused as futile because the relief they seek (i.e.,
money damages) is not allowed under the IDEA.
We agree with the District Court that the crux or gravamen of Plaintiffs’ amended
complaint was the denial of a FAPE. Far from merely referencing the SAFE PLAN to
“show that the Appellees were on notice of Louis’ inability to protect himself”
(Appellants’ Brief at 18), the pleading relied on this plan, which was developed to “allow
for the attendance of [an individual identified as having an intellectual disability as well
as speech and language impairment] at the East Stroudsburg Area School District.”
(A35.) The amended complaint specifically alleged that, “[d]uring Louis’ attendance at
the East Stroudsburg High School North, the Defendants did not follow his ‘SAFE
PLAN.’” (A36; see also, e.g., id. (“At no time prior to treating Louis in this way did the
Defendants call the Plaintiffs and/or 911 as indicated in Louis’ ‘SAFE PLAN’.”).)
Plaintiffs further claimed that, “[d]ue to Plaintiffs’ concerns over the East Stroudsburg
Area School District [sic] to educate their son, Plaintiffs enrolled Louis in the Colonial
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Academy in Wind Gap, Pennsylvania in November of 2015, necessitating a one hour one
way bus ride for Louis to attend school.” (A36-A37.) In turn, Louis allegedly “will
require additional educational support beyond the time frame mandated by the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.” (A38.) Plaintiffs even went to so far as to allege that
the Defendants’ conduct “has deprived Louis Ahearn of a free appropriate public
education” (and as a result allegedly constituted unlawful discrimination under the
Fourteenth Amendment). (A37.) Finally, we agree with the District Court that “‘[i]t is of
no moment that plaintiffs only seek monetary damages in their complaint.’” Ahearn,
2020 WL 754337, at *7 (quoting J.A. ex rel. Leduc v. Wyoming Valley W. Sch. Dist.,
Civil No. 15-1750, 2016 WL 4502451, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 29, 2016), aff’d, 722 F.
App’x 190 (3d Cir. 2018)); see also, e.g., Rohrbaugh ex rel. Rohrbaugh v. Lincoln
Intermediate Unit, 255 F. Supp. 3d 589, 597-98 (M.D. Pa. 2017) (recognizing that
restraint techniques are not implemented on adult employees of schools nor are they
implemented on minors in other public institutions and that alleged conduct was unique
to disabled student at school, thereby indicating that complaint probably did concern a
FAPE).
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court.
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